| Opolis as a new way to address Email weaknesses | | | | cryptography is the use of asymmetric key algorithms, |
| In March 2010 Opolis Secure Mail and Document | | | | where the key used to encrypt a message is not the |
| Messaging Service ( was launched with the aim to | | | | same as the key used to decrypt it. Each user has a |
| address key weaknesses in standard Email | | | | pair of cryptographic keys — a Public Key and a |
| applications. Accounts with Opolis are free. The | | | | Private Key. The Private Key is kept secret, whilst the |
| following article looks at some of the key issues in | | | | Public Key may be widely distributed. Messages are |
| today´s Email architecture and how Opolis intends to | | | | encrypted with the recipient's Public Key and can only |
| address them. | | | | be decrypted with the corresponding Private Key. The |
| Key issues of the current architecture and mechanics | | | | keys are related mathematically, but the Private Key |
| of standard Email applications | | | | cannot be feasibly (i.e., in actual or projected practice) |
| Email systems are based on a store-and-forward | | | | derived from the Public Key. |
| model in which Email computer server systems | | | | An analogy to Public-Private Key encryption is that of |
| accept, forward, deliver and store messages on behalf | | | | a locked mailbox with a mail slot. The mail slot is |
| of users. Originally, Email was transmitted directly from | | | | exposed and accessible to the public; its location (the |
| one user's device to another's; nowadays this is rarely | | | | street address) is in essence the Public Key. Anyone |
| the case. In such an environment, Email privacy can be | | | | knowing the street address can go to the door and |
| compromised because: | | | | drop a written message through the slot; however, |
| - Email messages are generally not encrypted; | | | | only the person who possesses the (Private) key can |
| - Email messages have to go through intermediate | | | | open the mailbox and read the message. |
| computers before reaching their destination, meaning it | | | | Confidence (ideally proof) that a Public Key is correct |
| is relatively easy to intercept and read messages; and | | | | and belongs to the person or entity claimed (i.e., is |
| - Many Internet Service Providers (ISP) store copies of | | | | 'authentic'), and has not been tampered with or |
| Email messages on their mail servers before they are | | | | replaced by a malicious third party is essential for |
| delivered. The backups of these can remain for up to | | | | Public-Private Key technology. The usual approach is |
| several months on their server, despite deletion from | | | | to use a Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), in which one or |
| the mailbox. | | | | more third parties, known as certificate authorities, |
| This may even lead to situations in which Email content | | | | certify ownership of key pairs. |
| and traffic information flow can be manipulated by the | | | | Opolis - Secure Mail and Document Messaging Service |
| recipient. - Or, once sent, Email with confidential content | | | | At the moment, Opolis is one of few globally operating |
| can be - intentionally or accidentally - forwarded to any | | | | service providers with a focus on point-to-point Email |
| third party. Not only that this third party should never | | | | security for corporate and private users. Opolis |
| have received that information, but the originator of the | | | | addresses the concerns of the current issues in |
| message has neither control nor may even be aware | | | | regards to Email traffic architecture by applying |
| of what actually happened. In the current Email | | | | Public-Private Key technology to transmit and |
| architecture there is only a very limited technical | | | | interim-store messages. On top, the sender has |
| possibility to pull back accidentally sent Emails. | | | | always full authority over what the recipient is allowed |
| In essence, tracking Emails and monitor what a | | | | to do with a message and is empowered to monitor |
| recipient of an Email has actually done with it, is virtually | | | | the flow of a message sent. |
| impossible in the current Email traffic architecture. | | | | Treating any message and its attachments as |
| A technical framework addressing key issues of the | | | | confidential information, Opolis combines the latest |
| current Email architecture | | | | Email security technologies and transmits, processes |
| Ideally, an Email is immediately encrypted when | | | | and stores all messages in encrypted mode. Using |
| pressing the Send button and subsequently transmitted | | | | Public-Private Key encryption methodology |
| and interim-stored on servers in encrypted mode only. | | | | (cryptographic keys), with Opolis messages and |
| Eventually only the authorized recipient shall be able to | | | | attached documents are immediately encrypted when |
| decrypted and read the message, and nobody else. | | | | sent and can only be encrypted and read by the |
| In optimal circumstances, a sender can also decide | | | | authorised recipient and nobody else. |
| what the recipient of a message is allowed to do with | | | | Opolis operates on any PC in parallel to standard Email |
| it and is in a position to monitor the path of a sent | | | | applications, such as Microsoft´s Outlook or Apple´s |
| message. | | | | Mail. Opolis aims to empower the sender to optimally |
| The technologies and elements for such an ideal Email | | | | protect Emails and attachments: |
| traffic architecture have already been available for | | | | - The sender decides what the recipient of a |
| quite a while. They have also been implemented within | | | | message is allowed to do with it. For example, the |
| numerous - mostly larger - corporations, many of them | | | | sender decides whether the recipient may copy, print, |
| operating globally. However, any messages leaving | | | | respond to or forward a message to another Opolis |
| such a protected Email traffic architecture are - | | | | User or not ("I Decide"). |
| unfortunately – always a potential target for abuse | | | | - The sender is also able to monitor how the recipient |
| and manipulation. | | | | has further processed the received message. - The |
| A primer to Public-Private Key technology | | | | path and status of each message sent can constantly |
| The distinguishing technique used in Public-Private Key | | | | be monitored live ("I Control"). |